In this paper we introduce a theoretical framework and a logical application for analyzing the semantics and pragmatics of contrastive conjunctions in natural language. It is shown how expressions like although, nevertheless, yet and but are semantically definable as connectives using an operator for implication in natural language and how similar pragmatic principles affect the behaviour of both contrastive conjunctions and indicative conditionals. Following previous proposals, conditions on contrast in a conjunction are analyzed as presuppositions of the conjunction. Further linguistic evidence leads to a distinction between restrictive and non-restrictive connectives of contrast, and consequently between direct and indirect contrast, which are given a precise definition.
Introduction
Natural languages support their speakers with many ways of expressing contrast between elements in a sentence or in a discourse. Particles like (al)though, but, yet, nevertheless are some of the common expressions in English used for this purpose. Still, a formal semantic theory may find the notion of 'contrast' quite obscure. The difficulty was wonderfully expressed by Frege in "On Sense and Reference": "Subsidiary clauses beginning with 'although' also express complete thoughts. This conjunction actually has no sense and does not change the sense of the clause but only illuminates it in peculiar fashion (similarly in the case of 'but','yet'). We could indeed replace the concessive clause without harm to the truth of the whole by another of the same truth value; but the light in which the clause is placed by the conjunction might then easily appear unsuitable, as if a song with a sad subject were to be sung in a lively fashion." (Frege, G., "On Sense and Reference", Geach and Black(eds.) (1970), pp. 73-74) Here we would like to maintain that what was called by Frege "the light in which the clause is placed by the conjunction" can be explained using less mysterious terms from contemporary semantic and pragmatic theories. Sharing linguistic intuitions with some previous works, especially Anscombre & Ducrot(1977) and Lang(1984) , we try to establish a logical framework that captures these intuitions. Essentially, we claim that the restrictions on contrastive conjunctions and the information they convey can be formulated as presuppositions of the conjunction. These presuppositions are stated using a schema that assumes a definition for the relation of implication between sentences/utterances in the language. Therefore, what we first propose is a reduction of the problem of contrast in natural language into the much more investigated problem of implication, a manifold puzzle that was discussed in the large literature on indicative conditionals, counterfactuals and pragmatic implicatures. Then, our next step is to restrict this reduction-to find and to spell out general meaning (/use) postulates for the connectives of contrast and the implication operator they involve. The postulates are stated using the possibility and necessity operators of modal logic. The presuppositions for contrast together with these restrictions constitute what we call an "interface" to a formal theory of implication in possible world semantics. An interesting version of such a theory was presented by Veltman in his article "Data Semantics and the Pragmatics of Indicative Conditionals" (Veltman(1986) ). We use the proposed interface to incorporate the connectives of contrast into Veltman's Data Logic and prove the extended semantics for Contrastive Data Logic (CDL) to satisfy the restrictions of the interface, hence also the basic linguistic motivations.
Many theories for implication in natural language are sensitive to the well-known "paradoxes" of implication: the counter-intuitive inferences that establish the truth of a conditional from the falsehood of the antecedent or truth of the consequent. We show how similar "paradoxes" of contrast are entailed by these problems. To account for such counter-intuitive results on implication in Data Logic Veltman uses a principle of "pragmatic unsoundness". We add a principle of "pragmatic insufficiency", that together with more specific pragmatic assumptions deals properly with the "paradoxes" of contrast, as well as other interactions in natural language between conditionals and modalities or contrastive elements. Some examples for this application of CDL are analyzed.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 brings the essential linguistic data and presents a general intuitive definition for the presuppositions for contrast in a conjunction. In section 3 we formalize these intuitive ideas and establish the restrictions in an interface to a theory of implication, based on some more involved linguistic evidence. The "paradoxes" of contrast and their connection to the "paradoxes" of implication are presented and analyzed. In section 4, CDL, the application of the semantic interface to Data Logic is presented, and the required features in the interface are proved. Section 5 includes the proposed generalization to Veltman's pragmatic framework. It is shown how the pragmatic principles are applied to handle the "paradoxes" of contrast and further linguistic evidence on the use of contrastive conjunctions in natural language.
Linguistic evidence and some primary motivations
Let the notation CON 2 stand for the class of the CONnectives of CONtrast, which consists at least of the following members: but, nevertheless, yet, although, though, even though. If we try to follow Frege's line of thought in the above quotation, then the truth conditions of a contrastive conjunction p con q 1 are identical to those of the parallel conjunction p and q . One part of this identity is certainly true-by no doubt sentences like (1a) logically entail their and counterpart (1b):
(1) a. I love Venice but I would not like to be there again.
b. I love Venice and I would not like to be there again.
Then we come to the question of whether boolean conjunction is the only truth conditional content of the (1) c. ? I love Venice but I would like to be there again. d. I love Venice and I would like to be there again.
It seems plausible to claim that examples like (1c) cannot be considered a case where some truth condition of the sentence is false, at least not in the traditional definition for truth conditions. This claim is the essence of Frege's remark and conclusions in the same spirit were drawn later in Grice(1961:pp.127-9) , Kempson(1975:p.57 ), Wilson(1975:pp.118-20) and Gazdar(1979:p.38) , to name just a few. There are some convincing arguments to support such a conclusion. Here are two of them:
1. The sentence (1c) and similar "odd" contrastive conjunctions can become highly acceptable in a specific "strange" context like:
(2) You know, I always hated to visit again cities that I love. Not in the case of Venice: I love it but I would like to be there again.
It is hard to see how the change in the context in (2) could affect the truth value of a statement that the but sentence conveys.
2. Negation of (1c) does not ameliorate it (to say the least), as would have been expected if it was to be considered as representing a false statement. For example:
(3) ? It is not true that [ I love Venice but I would like to be there again].
Similarly, acceptable but sentences like (1a) cannot be negated in order to indicate that the but connective is misplaced and only an and conjunction is true, as would have been expected if a but conjunction was to be analyzed as logically stronger than the parallel and conjunction. For example: (4) It is not true that [ I love Venice but I wouldn't like to be there again]. ? Actually, I like it and I hate to visit again cities that I like.
Similar observations hold with other members of CON 2 . 2 A conclusion in the lines of Frege's remark seems then to be most plausible:
The truth conditions of any contrastive conjunction p con q are exactly the same as those of p and q.
If instead of a truth conditional analysis we consider utterances like (1c) to be a case of presupposition failure then (2) and (3) can be explained using two known features of presuppositions: one by their context dependency, the other by their preservation under negation (cf. Gazdar(1979: chapter 5) , for example, for a discussion of these issues and bibliography). Following Gazdar, we refer to utterances like (1c) as infelicitous.
Some researchers consider the non-truth functional part of the meaning of but as a conventional implicature of the conjunction. This view is brought in Grice(1961:p.129) 3 and more explicitly in Gazdar(1979:p.38) . Given the range of examples in the literature for conventional implicatures and presuppositions, it seems that the phenomenon at stack is more close to what was classified as conventional implicature. However, as we share with Karttunen and Peters(1979) the view that there is much overlapping between the phenomena classified using these two terms, we henceforth use only the term presupposition in referring to the non-truth-functional part of meaning which is in focus.
The question is then what are the presuppositions for contrast which are induced by the members of Reasonably, a rough formulation of the contrastive presupposition of a sentence in the form p yet q or q although p can be stated simply as:
In (5a), p (= a= "it was cloudy") does not imply not(q) (= not(b) = "it was not raining"), so (A) does not hold and therefore the sentence is infelicitous. In (5b) p does imply not(q) (= b = "it was raining") and the sentence is felicitous. The same is with respect to (5c) and (5d). At this stage we are still not trying to explain what exactly do we mean in the relation "imply" between two sentences. The reader can think of this relation for the moment as something akin to "default" implication (as in an indicative conditional, e.g. "Normally, if it's cloudy then it rains."). The recognized advantage of this vague notion is its intuitive appeal to speakers, and thus it may help us when trying to outline the informal presupposition schemata for members of CON 2 . Later, when we use these schemata within a formal framework, the elusive nature of the notion "implication" will become our main concern.
Clearly, (A) is too strong to account for certain other examples of contrastive conjunctions. For example: In a "standard" context for (6a-c) p does not imply not(q), and as predicted by (A), (6b) and (6c) are indeed infelicitous. 4 The but conjunction in (6a), however, is still felicitous. Another example for this difference between but and other connectives of contrast is: (7) a. It is raining but I took an umbrella. (Therefore, I won't get wet).
b. ? It is raining; nevertheless, I took an umbrella. (Therefore, I won't get wet). c. ? I took an umbrella even though it is raining. (Therefore, I won't get wet).
Once again, (A) is too strong for a but sentence like (7a) while it does predict the infelicity of (7b) and (7c). Also, the way it accounts for their infelicity is very intuitive; for instance-an expected reaction from a hearer of a sentence like (7b) or (7c) is: "What, for heaven's sake, is so special in taking an umbrella when it rains outside ?". In the same way condition (A) also explains why when one of the conjuncts is negated in (7b) or (7c) the sentence becomes highly acceptable: (7) d. It is not raining; nevertheless, I took an umbrella.
e. It is raining; nevertheless, I did not take an umbrella.
Sentences as in (6) and (7) show that the case of but is different from those of yet, although, nevertheless, even though and other connectives of contrast. While the later require, as (A) claims, a direct relation between the conjuncts, in the former only some kind of an indirect relation between the conjuncts may be sufficient for coherence. In our proposed formalization for this "indirect contrast" we follow (independently) ideas of Lang in his discussion of German aber (see Lang(1984:pp.169-175) ) and Anscombre & Ducrot in their account for the French mais (see Ducrot(1977), Ducrot et. al.(1980:pp.93-130) ). 5 The basic idea is this: for a contrastive conjunction p con q to be felicitous in a given context there should be some statement which p implies and q denies. Let us use the notation r to represent the negation of such a statement. The statement p then implies not(r) and q implies r (q denies not(r)). The statement r is an overall implication of the whole contrastive sentence. Consider for example (6a): a possible r is "we didn't eat", as p (= "we wanted to eat") can imply "we ate" (= not(r)) and q (= "the restaurants were closed") implies "we didn't eat" (r).
Similarly, in sentence (7a) a possible r can be "I will not get wet". The conjunct p (rain) implies the possibility of getting wet (not(r)). The conjunct q (umbrella) implies r, the negation of this possibility.
The intention of a speaker in uttering any CON 2 sentence is always to make an argument in favour of a certain r. In the case of yet, although and most other members of CON 2 , r should be expressed explicitly as the conjunct q. In the case of but, r can also be introduced implicitly, using the context of utterance, as in (6a) and (7a). A general condition, presupposed for all the CON 2 sentences is therefore:
There exists a statement r s.t. in the context of utterance:
(C1) p implies not(r) and q implies r.
For a large sub-class of CON 2 (including nevertheless, although, etc.) (C1) should be restricted as follows:
is exactly (A), since under any sense we can use "imply", it is certainly a reflexive relation, and then the requirement "q implies r" in (C1) is trivially satisfied when r= q. In general, (C1) by no way requires that r is unique. A but utterance may be vague with respect to the r that is intended to be implied. For example: both following inferences in (8) The "therefore" contexts in (9) are interesting also from another respect. We see here that as we claimed, r, which is implied by q, is an acceptable conclusion from the whole but conjunction. On the other hand, not(r) is implied by p, and both p and q are true, so what is the principle that allows r as a conclusion from p but q and does not allow r's negation ? We must conclude, as Anscombre and Ducrot observe too, that in some sense the implication "q implies r" is "stronger" than the implication "p implies not(r)" and an application of a principle like Modus Ponens is allowed only for the "stronger" implication. Another way to look at this fact is to say that q denies not(r) or that application of Modus Ponens to the second implication cancels conclusions obtained by Modus Ponens applied to the first implication. Whatever notion we choose, "strength" (of implications) or "cancellation" (of conclusions) should be explained formally. For the meantime, let us only state this as another informal condition on CON 2 sentences:
(C2) q's implication of r is "stronger" than / "cancels" p's implication of not(r).
Note that (C2) should be trivially satisfied when (C1) [restricted] holds, since it should be guaranteed that the logical entailment between q and itself is a "stronger" implication than p's implication of not(q). Evidently, p cannot logically entail not(q), to avoid a contradiction caused by the truth condition p and q.
(C2) can easily account for the strong asymmetries in the romantic implications between (10a) and (10b) 6 :
(10) a. There are many girls around but YOU are special. b. You ARE special but there are many girls around.
and for similar asymmetries in the more prosaic (11a-d):
(11) a. It was cloudy but it did not rain. So we went for a walk. b. It was cloudy but it did not rain. ? So we did not go for a walk. c. It did not rain but it was cloudy. ? So we went for a walk. d. It did not rain but it was cloudy. So we did not go for a walk.
One interesting feature of the correlating r, and another evidence for its significance in contrastive conjunctions is that even in but conjunctions, where it can be distinct from q, it should obey general principles of discourse. Consider for example the following fragments of discourse: (12) In (12b)(1) the but sentence is incoherent, since any possible r like "John is a better player than Bill" is irrelevant/uninformative to the conversation, as observed in (12b)(2). In (12a), by contrast, the relevance of this r, which is evident from the coherence of (12a)(2), makes the same but sentence (12a)(1) coherent. The incoherence of (12b)(1) does not have to do with the relevance of the conjuncts themselves, because (12b)(3), the linear inversion of the conjuncts, is completely coherent.
Such facts on "relevance" to discourse are not, evidently, special to contrastive conjunctions, and therefore any theory of discourse that may explain what is "to be relevant", "to be informative" etc., should handle these examples, to guarantee that r is "relevant" and "informative" in the conversation. It is not, we conclude, something that should be stated in the presuppositions of contrastive conjunctions. We will get back to this point when we discuss "paradoxes" of implication and contrast in sub-section 3.3.
An interesting fact about conjunctions, which is somewhat surprising with respect to contrastive conjunctions, is that the mood of the conjuncts should not be the indicative and furthermore-each conjunct may be of a different mood or illocutionary force. Here are some examples:
(13) Take a chair, but don't sit. (14) Although I won't be able to stay for very long, I promise you to come. (15) Thanks for the ride, yet don't expect me to pay for it.
(16) You're the biggest idiot I've ever met, but don't be offended. (17) John is here but why isn't Bill here too ?
In this paper we discuss only conjunctions where both conjuncts are in the indicative mood.
The conjunction but deserves special attention because of its diverse features and broad circumstances of use. First, it is important to notice that throughout this work we discuss only one of the uses of the morpheme but in English, the contrastive (concessive/adversative) use as in: (18) John did not waste his money but he bought three books on the history of Lapland.
Here the books are implicated to be a waste of money, in contrast to the statement in the first conjunct.
A second use of but is for rectification(/correction):
(19) He is not intelligent, but just a grind.
(20) John did not waste his money but bought three books on the history of Lapland.
Sentence (20), opposed to (18) , implies that the books that John bought were not a waste of money (rectification of the predicate in the first conjunct). There are also some evident syntactic differences between these two uses of but. To name just two of them: the gapping effects in conjunctions with but for rectification, and the requirement that the first conjunct includes an overt negation in such constructions. In some languages such as Spanish, German and Hebrew these two uses of but involve distinct lexical entries: pero/sino, aber/sondern, aval/ela, respectively. This distinction is discussed extensively in previous works including: Tobler(1896) , Melander(1916) , Abraham(1977) , Anscombre and Ducrot(1977) , Dascal and Katriel(1977) , Horn(1985) and Horn(1989:pp.402-413) , which contains a detailed bibliographic survey.
Yet another use for but is in exceptive constructions. For example:
(21) Everyone but John came to the party.
For a semantic analysis of exceptive constructions see Hoeksema(1991) and von Fintel(1991) and their detailed bibliographic remarks. For a syntactic account see Reinhart(1991) . These facts may suggest that the morpheme but in English is at least three-way lexically ambiguous. However, there are some strong relations between these three senses of but, which suggest that the last word on this issue has not yet been given. 7 Some writers (e.g. R. , Blakemore(1989) ) have maintained that there are even two distinct senses for the use of but we labeled as contrastive 8 . The distinction made is between using but for "semantic opposition" and but as marking "denial of expectation". The two alleged senses can be exemplified by the following sentences, slight variations of examples from Lang(1984) : (22) John is quick but Bill is slow.
(23) John is quick but he is no good at football. While (22) was described as a "semantic opposition" use of but, which does not require any kind of world knowledge or contextual factors, (23) was considered as involving some further knowledge for modeling the "denial of expectation" in the second conjunct. We share with Lang the opinion that this distinction is theoretically problematic and not fully motivated by empirical data. For example: (22) might become infelicitous in cases where we are looking for a couple of persons, one quick and the other slow, and the sentence is given as an argument for John and Bill as an appropriate couple. It becomes hard to explain such facts with a theory that considers but ambiguous between "contrast" and "denial", since it has to be assumed then that the "contrastive" meaning of the connective disappears somehow in a situation like the above. Instead, we tend to prefer, with Lang, a theory that assigns but the same interpretation in all situations. Taking such a position, we have to show that sentences like (22) satisfy (C1) and (C2) in "normal" contexts. For example, if someone indicates that all the players in a team are quick, (22) can be used to deny this indication, provided that John and Bill are in the team. (C1) and (C2) are then satisfied with r= "not all the players in the team are quick". Thus, there are good reasons to stick to the null hypothesis (pace R. Lakoff and Blakemore) that no ambiguity whatsoever is to be attributed to the contrastive but.
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An interesting discussion of the French connective mais, with which we share many linguistic intuitions (but not methodological assumptions or descriptive tools) appears in Anscombre and Ducrot(1977) . A&D discuss mais within their framework of argumentative scales (echèlles argumentatives). As defined in Ducrot(1980:pp.15-18) , two sentences p 1 and p 2 are placed by the speaker in the same argumentative scale if there is a third sentence r for which he/she considers p 1 and p 2 as arguments. p 1 is said to be argumentatively superior to p 2 with respect to r if accepting r as a conclusion from p 2 implies that r is accepted as a conclusion from p 1 , but not the opposite. For A&D, an utterance of a sentence p mais q is possible if p and q are on "opposite" argumentative scales, where p is an argument in favour of r and q is an argument in favour of r's negation.
Clearly, our analysis of but is on the same lines of A&D. Our main objection to A&D's proposal is a conceptual one: it seems that argumentation in natural language is a name for a linguistic phenomenon and A&D's framework is more like a detailed and careful description of this phenomenon. To say that a sentence like "she is tall" is an argument in favour of the sentence "she is a good basketball player" is simply to restate the intuitions based on our world knowledge. It is not an explanatory model of the facts. In A&D's works it is assumed that argumentative scales exist but nothing in their discussion predicts which sentences are arguments in favour of which sentences in which contexts. Consequently, A&D's framework is rather informal.
What we try to do in the following sections is to use the linguistic intuitions (on which we agree with A&D in most cases) in order to provide a formal account of the informal notions "implication" and "strength of implication" in (C1) and (C2). We will try to show that there are strong relations between the kind of implication that exists in indicative conditionals and the implication operator that is needed to model contrast. In general, it is assumed that A&D's description of argumentative scales should be predicted by comprehensive semantic and pragmatic theories of contrast and implication in natural language.
Before going on, we may summarize the main ideas of this section. The class of connectives of contrast can be divided into two sub-classes-restrictive and non-restrictive. Some examples follow (non-exhaustive):
2. Non-Restrictive: but -conjunctions denoted p con q .
A presupposition for CON 2 conjunctions guarantees a relation of contrast between p and q:
For the restrictive sub-class of CON 2 , direct contrast must exist between the conjuncts. Direct contrast is established when conditions (C1) and (C2) hold with an r that is logically equivalent to q. Under this restriction (C1) and (C2) should boil down to:
A relation of contrast which is not direct is called indirect contrast. The non-restrictive members of CON 2 allow also indirect contrast between the conjuncts. In English, the most typical representative for the non-restrictive subclass of CON 2 is the connective but 10 , when it is used in a sentential contrastive conjunction 11 .
These are the key notions which we are going to need in order to provide a formal theory of contrast in natural language.
An interface to a theory of implication
In this section we introduce our first step in the formalization of the intuitive discussion of the previous section. The following steps are made in sections 4 and 5. As may be concluded from the discussion in section 2, the operator of implication we use should certainly be distinct from logical entailment (as it is cancellable and context depended) and still identifies neither with conversational implicature (as it emerges from the use of a specific contrastive connective) nor with conventional implicature (as each conjunct by itself does not conventionally implicates r or it's negation). It is closer to "default implication" as in a conditional like "Normally, if ... then ...", or to Anscombre and Ducrot's notion of argumentative scales.
As we see it, in order to be more useful, a formalization of a theory for phenomena as complex as contrast and implication should start by spelling out the restrictions on a formal system that is to be used as a model for the linguistic facts. Therefore, in this section we still do not present a complete definition for the relation "implies" between two sentences. Instead, we propose an "interface" for a theory of the semantics and pragmatics of implication within possible world semantics. This interface consists of the following parts:
1. Semantic definitions for the connectives of contrast in terms of the modal operators and the operators of implication and presupposition.
2. Restrictions on the operator of implication that emerge from its usage in the description of linguistic contrast.
3. Pragmatic requirements, especially due to the relations we find between the pragmatics of contrast and pragmatic accounts for the "paradoxes" of implication.
In sections 4 and 5 we present a specific implementation of this interface using Veltman's Data Logic, which is to exemplify one possible formal theory of contrast and implication.
Restatement of (C1) and (C2) in possible world semantics
Conditions (C1) and (C2) are an informal intuitive way to account for the restrictions on contrastive conjunctions. The possibility to state these conditions in completely formal terms depends on a full theory for two major notions in semantics and pragmatics: implication and presupposition. Suppose, for the sake of the discussion in this section, that we indeed have such a full unified theory. We use the notations x!y to stand for "x implies y" and pres(x) = y for "x presupposes y" without giving them a complete definition in this section (as explained in the introductionary remarks above). The connectives but and nevertheless (abbreviated as nvs) are used as representatives for the non-restrictive and restrictive subclasses of CON 2 , respectively.
How then could (C1) and (C2) be used to incorporate the two connectives but and nvs into such a theory, and what are the linguistic predictions of such an incorporation ?
The first question that comes to mind is with respect to the meaning of (C2): what is for not(r) to be "weakly implied" from p ? "Weak" semantic implication is something that has been extensively discussed in many works of formal semantics. Two major trends to analyze the problem in this respect are:
1. Non-monotonic reasoning: If ! is understood as a non-monotonic operator then a weak implication is simply an implication that can be canceled. A sentence p con q, therefore, can be analyzed as a containing two implications: p!: r and q!r , where some general "contrast" principle should cancel the first implication (or, alternatively, disallow any application of Modus Ponens to this implication).
Possible world semantics:
A weak implication is an implication in another possible world: x weakly implies y in a world w iff x!y in some world w' accessible to w.
In what follows we investigate only the second option. There is of course a lot to say also on the first one. We do not attempt to do it in this paper.
We are talking then possible worlds. Let us use the notations 3 and 2 as the possibility and necessity operators,^; _; : as usual, and ) as logical entailment (in terms of truth conditions). From (C1) and (C2) we can draw the following definition:
(D 1 ) The contrast relation: A proposition r establishes contrast between two (ordered) propositions p and q iff 3(p ! :r)^(q ! r) is true. This relation is denoted by Θ r (p; q).
Definition (D 1 ) introduces the notion of contrast in terms of the implication connective and the modal operator 3. We will not pay much attention to the "kind" of world where the weak implication is realized.
For instance, in (5b) this world can be called "standard", in (6), "expected". We maintain that such typology of possible worlds is linguistically meaningful only with a theory of how certain expressions (to want, to expect, etc.) affect the accessibility relations of the "actual" world. We do not wish to impose this problem on the other major problems with respect to CON 2 . Therefore we only use the possibility operator 3 with no specification of the type of possible worlds quantified over. Definition (D 1 ) can now be applied to derive from (C1) and (C2) the definitions of the truth conditions and the presuppositions of contrastive conjunctions 12 .
(D 2 ) p but q , p^q
How are these definitions interpreted in a certain semantics depends on the exact definitions for the notations used (pres, !, 3). Obviously, in proposing an "interface" one should take into account the restrictions on the interpretation of these notions that stem from linguistic evidence. Such restrictions should guarantee that any proposed semantics that uses this interface is adequate to linguistic data and not just a sterile formal machinery.
We therefore turn now to show some motivations or meaning postulates ("M's") that the above definitions for the truth conditions and presuppositions of but and nvs conjunctions should satisfy within any specific proposed semantic structure.
Semantic restrictions on the interpretation of (D 1 ) -(D 3 )
The first restriction is quite abstract: in order to guarantee that the intuition in (C2) is satisfied we must make sure that whenever the truth condition p^q and the presupposition Θ r (p; q) of a contrastive conjunction are satisfied, :r is only a weak implication of p, and not (accidentally) a strong one:
(M 1 ) Θ r (p; q)^p^q ) :(p ! :r) (if r establishes contrast between true p and q then p does not imply :r)
This should follow trivially from definitions if ! satisfies Modus Ponens.
A second more concrete M is based on the linguistic fact that any restrictive member of CON 2 (represented by nvs) can always be replaced by a non-restrictive but, while the opposite is not necessarily true (witness (6) and (7)):
(M 2 ) pres(p nvs q) ) pres(p but q) (the presupposition for direct contrast between p and q entails the presupposition for indirect contrast) pres(p but q) 6 ) pres(p nvs q) (the converse is not necessarily true)
The first entailment is of course immediate by definition, the second is not. Restriction (M 1 ) together with (M 2 ) guarantee that the intuition spelled out in (C2) is satisfied by both (D 2 ) and (D 3 ): (M 1 ) entails that definition (D 2 ) satisfies (C2) and (M 2 ) claims that (D 3 ) is stronger than (D 2 ) .
The next M is on the interactions between the connectives of contrast and the possibility and necessity operators. Consider for example the sentences:
(24) a. It is possible for us to swim; nevertheless, we don't.
b. It is possible for us to swim; nevertheless, it isn't necessary.
(25) a. The coin wasn't in the drawer even though it could have been there. b. The coin didn't have to be in the drawer even though it could have been there.
The pattern of the a sentences above is (3p) nvs :p and the pattern of the b's is (3p) nvs :2p (the corresponding but patterns are consequences, respectively, of these two by (M 2 )). It seems very plausible to conclude that these two patterns are always felicitous whenever their conjuncts are true:
or alternatively:
The reason we provide here two alternatives for (M 3 ) is that although in most possible world semantics (M 3 ) is more general than (M 3 ') since usually 2p ) p and then :p ) :2p, in Veltman's data semantics that we use in section 4, the opposite (p ) 2p) holds for descriptive (= non-modal) p's. We want the more general among the (M 3 )'s to hold, whatever possible world semantics is used.
We turn now to some restrictions on the implication connective (!). The first restriction is trivial: In section 2 we required that (C1) holds whenever (C1)[restricted] (p weakly implies :q) is satisfied. This means we claim that Θ q (p; q) is entailed by 3(p ! :q) (the converse is by definition). Therefore we require that the proposition (q ! q) in Θ q (p; q) is vacuously satisfied, so ! must be a reflexive operator. This is a reasonable assumption to make in any other respect we can think of.
A more interesting restriction on ! is motivated by the following example: The plausible interpretation of the reply of the doctor is with an r as "the operation was successful" 13 . We are faced then with the following puzzle: How comes p ) q ("John walks slowly" logically entails "John walks"), q!r ("John walks" implies that "the operation was a success"), and still, we cannot conclude that p!r (certainly, "John walks slowly" does not imply here that "the operation was successful").
Two conclusions are possible: One possibility is that logical entailment is not a special case of !, i.e.
there can be sentences p and q s.t. p ) q and still in some possible world (p ! q) is false. An alternative conclusion can be that ! is not transitive. Actually, both these possibilities might seem plausible (but see sub-section 5.4): if we think of ! as some kind of a "cognitive reasoning" relation, then it should be neither transitive (why should we be capable of obtaining all the transitive closure of implications that we already know ?) nor containing the relation of logical entailment (why should we be capable of obtaining all the logical consequences of a statement ?). We may conclude that the analysis of contrast provides us with the following restriction on implication:
(M 4 ) The connective ! is a reflexive relation between sentences s.t. either ! is not transitive or logical entailment ()) is not a special case of !. 14 The but sentence in (26) is a case of "redundant" affirmation, which is discussed extensively in Horn(1991 (27) It's odd that dogs eat cheese but they do.
(28) He regrets that he said it but he did say it.
(29) While she was dying, and I knew she was dying, I wrote my best book. I wrote it in agony but I wrote it.
"Redundant" affirmation like in these sentences shows that the fact that the sentence q is presupposed or even logically entailed by p is not enough to make sure that all the information it conveys arrives to the addressee. When q is added "redundantly" as a but conjunct the rhetorical contrast (in Horn's terms) or the indirect contrast established by r (as in our analysis of (26)) is conveyed and changes the information that p alone would convey. For some further points concerning contrast and "redundant" affirmation see conjecture 1 in the following sub-section and also the discussion in sub-section 5.4. Definitions (D 1 )-(D 3 ) together with the restrictions (M 1 )-(M 4 ) form a general framework for a formal theory of connectives of contrast within possible world semantics. By this by no means we intend to imply that the notion of contrast is a pure semantic one. Definitions (D 1 )-(D 3 ) should be adopted within a theory of the semantic and pragmatic aspects of implication and modal operators. We also do not assume that the operator of presuppositions is in a linguistic semantic level. It is only important to notice that unlike other kinds of presuppositions, the schemata in (D 2 ) and (D 3 ) cannot be canceled in a contrastive conjunction: contrast between the conjuncts should be established under any linguistic context. This was noted already by Grice in Grice(1961:p.129) , when discussing the peculiarity of utterances like:
(30) She is poor but she is honest, ? though I don't want to imply there is any contrast between poverty and honesty.
Therefore, our notation pres stands for a presupposition more in the sense of Karttunen and Peters' conventional implicature and is quite distinct from Gazdar's view of presupposition. The non-cancelablity of contrast makes it easier to incorporate (D 2 ) and (D 3 ) to a formal semantic logical mechanism. By (M 1 )-(M 4 ) we are trying to draw some restrictions on the way the definitions are incorporated into a semantic structure. There can still be other restrictions to be drawn and there are certainly further pragmatic restrictions (as in (12)). One last remark: (D 1 )-(D 3 ) do not have to remain exactly the same in any kind of possible world semantics; they are a basis for principled variations. In section 4 we investigate an implementation of this general interface within Veltman's possible world semantics for conditionals, and then it will be evident that one slight variation of the static (D 1 ) is needed due to the "dynamic" nature of this specific semantics.
"Paradoxes" of contrast, further restrictions on (D 1 )-(D 3 )
A theory of contrast in the lines that were drawn, which leans heavily on an operator of implication in natural language, is threatened by the well-known (so-called) "paradoxes" of implication. Such "paradoxes" occur, for example, when ! is interpreted as the material implication (x ! y iff :x _ y): assume that you want to convince someone that x ! y is true. Will it indeed be enough for you to convince him either that x is false or that y is true ?
For instance: why do the following inferences look suspicious ? These are problems for material implication 15 , but they are shared by many other common accounts of implication in natural language. Our point is that when this kind of puzzle is created by the definition for the meaning of ! it causes similar problems for the analysis of the felicity of contrastive conjunctions. For instance: suppose that someone knows that there is a possibility that a statement p is false (3:p). Will (s)he then be willing to accept any sentence of the form p nvs q as felicitous, as the trivial satisfaction of (D 3 ) (3(p ! :q)) predicts ? Suppose you know there exists a possibility that John does not sneeze and you tell it to somebody. Will you be ready to accept the following response as felicitous ?
(33) ? Generally, there's a possibility that John doesn't sneeze. Actually, he sneezes; nevertheless, Hans
Eisler was a German composer.
The inferences in question, which in most possible world semantics are derivable from (I 1 ) and (I 2 ) are:
3:x 3(x ! y)
There is independent linguistic evidence for the implausibility of inferences rules (I 3 )-(I 4 ) in natural language. Consider for example the following variation on (31a): r^3:r Θ r (p; q) (= pres(p but q)) This seems quite traumatic: how can evidence on r^3:r allow automatically any but conjunction, with no respect to identity of the conjuncts ? The problem looks even harder as one notices that according to most possible world semantics the existence of a proposition r such that r^3:r holds is something that should happen in usual linguistic contexts: it only requires the existence of one possible world distinct from the "actual" one ! As (I 5 )-(I 7 ) are closely related to the well-known (I 1 )-(I 2 ), we will refer to them as the "paradoxes" of contrast (an alternative name could be '"paradoxes" of weak implication').
Note also the similarity between utterances like (33) and ones like (12b)(1) (section 2). In (12) the problem seemed to be the (missing) "relevance" of r to the context. In (33) the problem is the "relevance" of the conjuncts p and q to each other. However, (33) is problematic only for treatments of ! that allow for inferences (I 1 ) and (I 2 ) and do not have an explanation for their alleged unsoundness.
So, the origins of the problem are the well-discussed "paradoxes" (I 1 ) and (I 2 ) for (material) implication. Basically, there are two main trends in the literature to deal with this kind of problems: one possible strategy claims that (I 1 ) and (I 2 ) are semantic problems for any operator of implication for which they are valid. Therefore, according to this point of view, material implication and many other implication operators are not very relevant for the semantics of implication in natural language (and also in mathematics, if accepting the paradigm of Relevance Logic). Another trend maintains that (I 1 ) and (I 2 ) are to be considered logically valid, and that the question why human beings do not tend to accept these inferences as generally sound should be answered using pragmatic considerations.
Whatever position to be taken, we do not consider possible restrictions on ! that are designed to cope with the "paradoxes" of implication to be part of the semantic interface for CON 2 . This should be done by any specific semantic and pragmatic application proposed for the interface. It should be clear, though, that any substantial semantic or pragmatic theory that deals with the problems that (I 1 ) and (I 2 ) raise should explain what is wrong with (I 3 ) and (I 4 ), thus also with (I 5 )-(I 7 ), the "paradoxes" of contrast.
In sections 4 and 5 we apply the interface to Veltman's theory of indicative conditionals, and there it will be our job to explain how these problems are overcome (see 5.3).
A closely related question that comes to mind is whether there are any inherent restrictions on the conjuncts, which should prevent sentences like:
(35) ? Isaac won the elections in Jamaica but it is not raining today in Paris.
Generally speaking, when (35) is uttered with no further information it surely sounds like nonsense. After all, what can be the contrast between the results of the elections in Jamaica and the rain in Paris. But consider now the following context:
A and B made a bet: if both Isaac wins the elections in Jamaica and it rains today in Paris, then B pays A a hundred dollars. Now imagine the following conversation: A: Hi B, I've just heard in the radio that Isaac won the elections in Jamaica. You know this means that you owe me a hundred dollars. B: Come on, Isaac won the elections in Jamaica but it is not raining today in Paris. I don't owe you anything.
Here the "bet" context supplies an admissible r to the but conjunction; namely "B does not owe A a hundred dollars". The possibility to create such a context almost for every two sentences is an evidence in favour of the following conjecture:
Conjecture 1: For any two sentences that represent the (non-contradictory) statements p and q, contrast between p and q can be established using certain r and context.
The requirement that p and q are not contradictory is only because we restrict ourselves to contrast in CON 2 conjunctions, and it is hard to find linguistic evidence from these conjunctions for contrast between contradictory statements (funny as it may sound) because of the truth conditions for CON 2 conjunctions. Note that even when p logically entails q, contrast between p and q can be established, as witnessed by (26) 16 . However, probably not a direct contrast: similar examples with restrictive members of CON 2 seem to be infelicitous 17 :
(26') a. ? Your son walks slowly; nevertheless, he walks.
b. ? Your son walks although he walks slowly.
Such facts suggest the following possible restriction on the presupposition of contrast for the restrictive subclass of CON 2 :
Conjecture 2: p ! :q cannot be established when p ) q.
There is a strong connection between this last conjecture and the discussed "paradoxes" of implication:
In classical propositional logic, for instance, whenever p ) q the proposition p ! :q can be true if and only if p is false, and then a semantic/pragmatic theory that explains what is wrong with (I 1 ) should also predict that our conjecture 2 is true.
To summarize what has been done in this section: an admissible possible world semantics for contrast is any semantics with definitions for implication (!), presuppositions and the possibility and necessity operators, in which definitions (D 1 )-(D 3 ) satisfy the restrictions (M 1 )-(M 4 ). These D's and M's constitute the "semantic interface" for a theory of implication in possible world semantics. The so-called "paradoxes" of contrast should be handled by the same semantic or pragmatic mechanisms that handle the "paradoxes" of implication.
In sections 4 and 5 we are going to show that Veltman's Data Logic is such an admissible semantics. We also claim that the pragmatic principles introduced by Veltman are the key to handle the "paradoxes" of contrast in this framework, and that together with the application of the interface to Data Logic they are capable of explaining a large portion of contrastive phenomena in natural language.
Former proposals for a logical analysis of contrastive conjunctions are included in Francez(1991) and Meyer & van der Hoek(1991) . Our proposal here is inspired by the two works, but see footnote for some central points of disagreement. 18
Interlude -Nesting of contrast operators
A subtle empirical question raised by the works of Francez and Meyer & van der Hoek, which is extremely important for a complete formalization of contrast, is the question of nesting of contrast operators. Meyer & van der Hoek consider the following sentence an example for that:
(36) Tweety is a bird but she does not fly but she is high up in the air (in an airplane, for instance).
We are not completely sure that this is an acceptable example in English, but this should not obscure the point here: various kinds of iteration of contrast are quite acceptable in conversation. For example:
(37) A: Did you know it ? Tweety is high up in the air ! B: How can it be ? Tweety is a bird but she cannot fly !? A: But she is in an airplane. Ha Ha ! However, to convince ourselves that unfunny jokes like (37) are indeed a case of nesting we must become sure that it is indeed the contrast in what B says that A tries to contrast in his reaction. Here Meyer & van der Hoek's arguments do not seem very persuasive: A's reaction may be equally analyzed as contrasting only the second conjunct ("Tweety cannot fly") in B's utterance. We were not successful in finding a clear-cut example for a genuine nesting of contrastive operators. Even in the almost artificial (38a) the contrast in the second sentence can be analyzed with respect to the boolean conjunction in the first one, as observed in (38b): (38) a. It was cloudy but it did not rain. Nevertheless, we were not surprised.
b. It was cloudy and it did not rain. Nevertheless, we were not surprised.
We therefore tend to think that members of CON 2 cannot be used "meta-linguistically"-to convey contrast to implications from linguistic conditions on an utterance (e.g. conditions on contrast between elements within one of the conjuncts). It seems that a similar conclusion can be drawn from a remark in the appendix in Horn(1985) . However, the empirical status of "genuine" nesting of contrast is not completely clear to us.
From a logical point of view, this is not to say that the problem of nesting of contrast operators is uninteresting, on the contrary. Still, a full analysis of the formal aspects of nesting would have dictated an entirely different approach to this work, and we must defer it to another occasion.
Contrastive Data Logic -an incorporation of the connectives of contrast into Veltman's data semantics for conditionals
In this section a possible application of the "semantic interface" proposed in the previous section is investigated. The connectives but and nvs are incorporated into the syntax and semantics of the formalism of Data Logic proposed in Veltman(1986) . The resulting extended logic will be called Contrastive Data Logic (CDL). We chose to use Veltman's data semantics as a case study because of its formal elegance and the interesting pragmatic part of his analysis for indicative conditionals. Another interesting aspect of Veltman's data semantics is its "dynamic" conception of knowledge, which dictates some recapitulation in the proposed static definition for contrast (D 1 ).
For the convenience of the reader we first briefly summarize the main ideas and definitions in Veltman(1986) that are needed for our purposes. However, in order to understand also the linguistic and philosophical motivations behind Veltman's theory, familiarity with his brief and stimulating work is recommended.
Data semantics -the basic definitions
Let the logical language L have a vocabulary that consists of a set P of atomic propositions, parentheses, the one-place operators :, may and must, and the two-place connectives^; _ and !. The syntax of L is defined using the standard formation rules for these operators.
The operators may and must stand for the epistemic readings of the corresponding modalities in English, ! stands for the indicative conditional if...then.
A model for L is a partially ordered set S of information states and a valuation function V per state for the atomic propositions in P. Each state represents information (possibly partial) on the truth values of the atomic propositions. Growth of information is modeled by requiring that for any two states s 1 s 2 , V s 1 V s 2 . It is also assumed that each state can grow into a complete information state and therefore it is required that for each chain of ordered states there is a maximal state s, which is assigned a total valuation function V s . Formally:
An information model is a triple < S; ; V > with the following properties:
(i) S 6 = (ii) is a partial ordering of S. Each chain in < S; > contains a maximal element.
(iii) V is a function with a domain S:
(a) for each s 2S, V s is a partial function P ! f0; 1g. The semantics for L is defined in quite a natural way, where j= and =j are the satisfaction/falsification relations between an information state in an information model and propositions in L:
Let M =< S; ; V > be an information model and s 2 S. For every proposition A is L:
Otherwise, recursively: 
Incorporation of but and nvs -Contrastive Data Logic
We add now the two-place connectives but and nvs to the vocabulary of L, with the expected formation rules.
In order to define the semantics of these two connectives in data semantics we should adopt a "dynamic" notion of contrast, which is more appropriate here. This requires a slight modification in the straightforward translation of (D 1 ): instead of saying that p "weakly implies" :r and q implies r on the Presuppositions can be incorporated into data semantics by using the undefined truth value also to represent a case of presupposition failure. We use here a common semantic definition for presuppositions in multi-valued semantics: B = pres(A) iff A ) B and :A ) B Therefore, if (M,s) 6 j= A and (M,s) 6 =j A (A's truth value is undefined in s) then we can say that either (as in Veltman's original framework) there is no direct evidence in s for A, or that a presupposition of A is false in s. The difference between the two cases is that in the case of presupposition failure, even in a complete state of information A's truth value can remain undefined. Now we can define the truth-functional content of p but q and p nvs q as p^q, and their presuppositional content as Θ r (p; q) and Θ q (p; q), respectively: (M,s) j= p but q iff (M,s) j= p^q and there is a proposition r s. This definition for the semantics of the formal connectives but and nvs guarantees that the presupposition for contrast Θ r (p; q) is preserved under negation, which agrees with the linguistic intuitions presented in section 2. We do not try here to cope with other linguistic problems of presupposition accommodation, cancellation or modification. Our goal here in this respect is only to incorporate presuppositions into Data Logic with minimal technical complications. A better notion of presupposition in Data Logic can be achieved using orthogonal mechanisms of truth and presupposition-satisfaction assignments (four truth values) or using van Eijck's novel dynamic error state semantics (see van Eijck(1993) ).
Satisfaction of (M 1 )-(M 4 ) within CDL
In order to count CDL as an admissible application of the interface we presented, we should verify that the restrictions (M 1 )-(M 4 ) are satisfied in CDL.
Proposition 1: For descriptive propositions p,q, and r, (M 1 ) is satisfied: This is a problem for the linguistic adequacy of CDL that is to be discussed in sub-section 5.4, when the pragmatic principles are introduced. 
Proof: a is of course trivial.
b is also simple: Consider for example a model M with < S; > as in figure 2, p, q and r are atomic propositions and (M,s) j= p^q, (M,s 1 ) j= p^q^:r, (M,s 2 ) j= p^q^r. Therefore: (M,s 1 ) j= p ! :r and then (M,s) j= may(p ! :r). In s 2 we get (M,s 2 ) j= q ! r and then (M,s 2 ) j= Θ r (p; q). Still, in s, s 1 and s 2 the proposition p ! :q is false and therefore (M,s 2 ) 6 j= Θ q (p; q). Although both (M 3 ) and (M 3 ') hold in data semantics there is one property of this system, which is mentioned in Veltman(1986) , that shows a problem in the generality for such cases: for every description A, the proposition (mayA)^:A is a logical contradiction. There is a justification for that as long as mayA is used to express that "A is compatible with the evidence at the present state of information". But as witnessed by (24) and (25), this is not a reasonable consequence when may (or possible) in English is used to convey competence or ability to make A happen. Usually we can think of someone capable to do things even if those capabilities are not realized. Some kind of extension to Veltman's system is therefore due in order to capture this other use of modalities in natural language. We are not going to deal with this problem in this paper. Many discussions of the problem and related topics are present in the literature (cf. for example Karttunen(1971) and Kratzer(1977) ).
Proposition 5: () (M 4 )): ! is reflexive and not transitive.
Proof:
Reflexivity is trivial by definition.
For non-transitivity: consider for example again a model M with < S; > as in figure 2 , and an atomic proposition A is with undefined truth value in s, false in s 1 and true in s 2 . It is easy to see then that (M,s) j= ((mayA) ! A)^(A ! mustA) and still (M,s) =j ((mayA) ! mustA).
In some senses the result in proposition 5 is too weak, for as we saw in sentence (26) implication in natural language is a non-transitive operator also for descriptive propositions. However, it is easy to see that in CDL ! is transitive for descriptions. This problem for CDL is to be given a pragmatic account in section 5.4.
We may turn now to linguistic applications of CDL.
Pragmatic principles for CDL and linguistic predictions
In the previous section a formal semantics for the presupposition of contrast was defined. In this section we first show how CDL is applicable for simple examples of CON 2 sentences. But as Veltman maintains: "there is little sense in discussing a semantic theory-if, at least, it presents a semantics for conditionalswithout paying any attention to its ramifications for pragmatics". The same is true with respect to semantics for contrast. Especially as we are entirely not obliged to regard the presuppositional part of CDL as part of natural language semantic level (logical semantic mechanisms, like any other formal instrument, can be part also of a theory for natural language pragmatics !).
Thus, in the rest of this section we show how Veltman's pragmatic principles for Data Logic can be generalized and used in Contrastive Data Logic to account for the "paradoxes" of contrast, as well as more complex examples from natural language, especially the interaction between indicative conditionals and connectives of contrast.
Simple linguistic predictions of CDL
Propositions 1-5 in 4.3 showed that the semantics for CDL satisfies the essential semantic restrictions we have set in section 3. Here is a short summary of the linguistic facts that are therefore accounted for by CDL:
1. (M 1 ) shows that (C2) (section 2) is satisfied for descriptions, which explains the validity of inferences as in (9a) and the invalidity of inferences as in (9b). We still have to consider the case of nondescriptions (see 5.4).
2. (M 2 ) guarantees that a restrictive contrastive conjunction entails its non-restrictive counterpart, and that the opposite does not in general hold (witness (6), (7)).
3. The satisfaction of (M 3 ) accounts for the interaction between modal operators and connectives of contrast as in sentences in the general form of (24) or (25).
4. ! is not generally transitive in CDL. We still have to show how the transitivity of ! for descriptions is pragmatically harmless in order to account for peculiar examples as in (26) More concretely, we may turn now to some simple contrastive conjunctions and see how they are analyzed using CDL.
Reconsider sentence (7a):
A possible r here is a sentence like "I won't get wet". Let us use then R(rain) to represent p, U(umbrella) The presupposition, together with the truth condition R^U in s, establish (using weak Modus Ponens), that the speaker in (7a) is in a state of information s, where he/she is certain that she won't get wet, or :mayW . This can be verified linguistically as in the therefore context: (7a') It is raining but I took an umbrella. Therefore I cannot get wet.
In data semantic notions, the sentence (7a), with r that is realized as :W like in the context (7a'), can thus be paraphrased as something like: (39) I did not get wet although it was raining and I had not taken an umbrella.
This inspired sentence can be formalized in CDL as (R^:U ) nvs :W . The semantics of this formula in CDL also reflects the intuition behind (39):
"In a previous state of information, getting wet because of the rain and lack of umbrella was an open possibility. In the actual state, I am dry."
For the analysis of some more complex sentences we should consider also some pragmatic principles for Contrastive Data Logic.
Veltman's pragmatic unsoundness principle for Data Logic
The basic pragmatic principle for conditionals in data semantics is this: The existence of such a conversational implicature is a known fact on indicative conditionals (see also Karttunen and Peters(1979) for a discussion). In Veltman's framework it follows quite easily from traditional Gricean maxims (Grice(1975) , see Veltman(1986:pp.160-1) ). Intuitively, it guarantees that the fact that B is not false whenever A is true is not coincidental, but has something to do with A, B, and the present state of information.
In cases where this implicature does not hold "odd" conditionals appear, and Veltman shows how it is canceled then because of conversational effects. In such cases the speaker has to clarify that a conversational implicature has been violated. For example, in conditionals like "if... then I'm a monkey's uncle" the speaker is clearly violating a conversational maxim (quantity or manner, depending on the preferred analysis), since from our most basic world knowledge we can tell that the consequent is false. This cancels the conversational implicature mayB above. For our purpose here it suffices to assume the conversational implicature above, and not to consider "odd" instances of conditionals that cancel it. Also, we must clarify that we consider only indicative conditionals (counterfactuals have entirely different implicatures, see for example Karttunen and Peters(1979) ).
Using this implicature of A ! B we can explain why instances of the "paradoxes" of implication, although semantically valid in Data Logic (thus in CDL), are pragmatically incorrect. Reconsider for example the inference in:
(31) John does not sneeze. ? Therefore, if John sneezes then Eric Satie is a German philosopher.
Such patterns of inferences are semantically valid in Data Logic for stable propositions as the description in the statement of "John sneezes". But they do not agree with the following pragmatic principle that Veltman proposes:
"Any argument of which the premises cannot hold if one takes the implicatures of the conclusion into account is pragmatically unsound."
The intuition behind this principle is the following: suppose you want to convince someone that B is true and you use as argument the statements A 1 ; A 2 ; :::; A n from which one can validly infer B. Pragmatically, it is impossible to convince anyone using this argument in cases where B must be pragmatically incoherent because one of its (realized) implicatures is contradictory to the premises. Of course, if the speaker makes clear, like in the "odd" conditional above that a conversational maxim has been violated, then the argument can become pragmatically sound, because an implicature is canceled. However, since we do not address this point in the present discussion we simplify Veltman's condition and formalize it as:
(P 1 ) A valid inference rule with premises A 1 ; A 2 ; :::; A n and a conclusion B is pragmatically unsound if imp(B) contradicts the conjunction A 1^: ::^A n .
Principle (P 1 ) brings only one kind of pragmatically unsound inference rules. The "if" implies that there might be also other kinds of such arguments.
For the inference in (31a) it works as follows: The implicature "John may sneeze" of the conclusion contradicts in its Data Logic representation the premise "John does not sneeze". Therefore the argument is pragmatically unsound.
Instances of the "paradox" of implication in Data Logic that is due to truth of the consequent in a conditional are explained away in a similar fashion. Generally, the inferences:
are semantically valid in Data Logic when A and B are descriptions, but usually they are pragmatically unsound according to the definition of imp(A ! B) and principle (P 1 ).
Pragmatic (in)sufficiency
Veltman pragmatic unsoundness principle (P 1 ) handles the "paradoxes" of implication (I 1 ) and (I 2 ) for Data Logic. As we saw in 3.3, in order to deal also with the "paradoxes" of weak implication we have to explain what is wrong with the Data Logic inferences corresponding to (I 3 ) and ( I 4 If we use this definition we realize that (I 3 ') and (I 4 ') are not pragmatically unsound according to principle (P 1 ), as the implicature of the conclusion contradicts the premise in neither inference. Something different is going on here: it seems that the problem is that the premise is only not pragmatically sufficient to convince that the conclusion is true. But further information can do that, for example:
(40) Maybe John will come. And maybe he will come because he will want to see Laura. Therefore, maybe if John wants to see Laura he will come.
Similar tricks cannot be done with (I 1 ) or (I 2 ), hence the term pragmatic unsoundness for such inferences. The inferences (I 3 ) and (I 4 ) are only pragmatically insufficient and further information in the premise can ameliorate them. Here is an example for one evident principle of pragmatic sufficiency:
(P 2 ) A valid inference rule with premises A 1 ; A 2 ; :::; A n and a conclusion B is pragmatically sufficient if imp(B) is a logical consequence of the conjunction A 1^: ::^A n .
Once again, as in Veltman's principle (P 1 ), (P 2 ) is not a complete definition; we do not define all the pragmatically sufficient inference rules. To be sure, further development of pragmatic principles should guarantee that the inference rules (I 3 ') and (I 4 ') are pragmatically insufficient, which explains the "paradoxes" of contrast in CDL, as well as the incorrectness of inferences as in (34). Such a result is reasonable and to be assumed for the sake of the analysis in 5.5, but we are not in a position that we have enough tools to predict it from more general principles. Therefore, we put it only as an ad-hoc stipulation:
Assumption 1: (I 3 ') and (I 4 ') are pragmatically insufficient.
One more pragmatic result, which we are going to need, and does not follow directly from (P 1 ) or (P 2 ) is that the following inference rule is pragmatically sufficient:
An example for the pragmatic correctness of this inference follows in:
(41) Maybe John will come and bring his brother with him. Therefore, maybe if John comes he will bring his brother with him.
Our second ad-hoc stipulation is then:
Assumption 2: (I 8 ) is pragmatically sufficient.
The need to stipulate the pragmatic status of specific inference rules shows, evidently, that more general pragmatic principles should be added to (P 1 ) and (P 2 ). However, principles (P 1 ) and (P 2 ) and the specific assumptions, are capable to explain many effects in sentences with indicative conditionals also in interaction with contrastive elements. As we are interested here mainly in their applications, we leave the pragmatic generalizations needed to predict assumptions 1 and 2 for further research.
(M 1 ) and (M 4 ) and the pragmatics of CDL -Recapitulation
As we have mentioned (in sub-sections 4.3 and 5.1) the results in propositions 1 (for (M 1 )) and 5 (for (M 4 )) are somewhat unsatisfactory. We would like now to reconsider these problems in the light of the pragmatic principles brought in sub-sections 5.2 and 5.3.
Let us start with (M 4 ). The motivation in this requirement was to account for contrast between sentences with "redundant" affirmation as in (26), restated here:
(26) John walks slowly but he walks.
The problem was to explain why in a p but q conjunction p can logically entail q and q can imply r (= "the operation was successful") and still p does not imply r. We concluded that either logical entailment is not necessarily always an implication or implication is not transitive ((M 4 ) ). However, this is a "static" conclusion. It assumes that all propositions involved in the interpretation of a sentence are evaluated relative to one state of affairs. This is not the case in CDL: in CDL contrast in general is evaluated relative to two states of information: s and s 0 s (see figure 1 in The fact that (M 1 ) does not in general hold in CDL seems more like a genuine drawback of our proposal, which is a consequence of a problem for Veltman's theory to account for some interactions between conditionals and modality. (M 1 ) requires that p does not imply :r, in order for the implication of r to be "stronger" than the implication of :r. Proposition 1 proves this to be correct for descriptive propositions in CDL. However, we showed that in CDL contrast as in may:A but mayA can be established with r = A, where :A is (strongly) implied by p. Veltman's theory has no explanation for why sentences like (42) are unacceptable. This is the reason CDL also fails to handle properly such cases and consequently, fails to satisfy (M 1 ) for non-descriptions. We have no simple explanation to offer here and must leave this question open. The presupposition for contrast of p but q is satisfied in s, the state of information of the speaker in (43) because:
Some predictions of the interactions between indicative conditionals and connectives of contrast
1. The therefore context in (43) shows that the speaker assumes that q!r , or (may:R) ! may:Wgetting wet can be prevented when it is possible that it will not rain. This means that a weak implication of p here is that one won't get wet only if she takes an umbrella.
The conclusion is that pres(p but q) is satisfied in (44).
The following example of interaction between conditionals and contrastive conjunctions is very common in mathematical texts: We conclude that the presupposition for contrast is satisfied in (45).
There is naturally an enormous work left to be done on a formal pragmatic explanation for the variety of contrastive phenomena. Still, it seems that the correct predictions and the intuitive appeal of the analysis in this section show that the approach proposed here is on the right track and is useful for further research.
Conclusions
As it seems, problems of contrast in natural language reside in the twilight zone between semantics and pragmatics. The philosophical and linguistic ever-green enigma on meaning and use makes it hard to provide a full analysis for such phenomena. However, we believe that if linguistic evidence is used properly, it may lead to a comprehensive theory of the connections among notions such as contrast, implication, modal operators and presupposition.
The general paradigm we introduced in section 2 concerns these connections, especially the one between the first two notions: contrast and implication. This paradigm led us to develop the general application within possible world semantics and its specific implementation using Veltman's Data Logic and the associated line of pragmatic analysis.
We believe that Data Semantics is flexible enough to further improve our semantic and pragmatic proposals. Moreover, we believe that the paradigm on the linkage between contrast and implication is linguistically sound so it can lead us to a variety of alternative formal accounts of both phenomena and to a better insight into their puzzling nature.
Theories for contrast and implication in natural language also introduce interesting problems from a logical point of view, such as axiomatization of the contrastive connectives, nesting of contrast, and nonmonotonic reasoning. Linguistic observations as presented in this work might be an important perspective for further logical inquiries. We hope to be able to concentrate on some of these issues in the future.
Evidently, answers to many questions addressed in this paper are still in the dark; nevertheless, we hope it is a contribution for placing contrast in a more "suitable light". 8. It is not quite clear from the works of Lakoff and Blakemore whether they claim that there are two distinct lexical entries for the but's in (22) and (23). However, Lakoff's claim that (22) is a case where the but signals only "semantic opposition" and in (23) also pragmatic considerations are needed for the analysis of the conjunctions, seems to favour this interpretation of her claim, to the extent that it is interpretable at all.
9. Especially misleading is Blakemore's claim that "... [R. Lakoff's] proposal would seem to find support in the fact that in some languages (for example German, Spanish and Hebrew) but may be translated by either of two words.". Both uses of but that Lakoff discusses are translated as aber/pero/aval, and it is completely evident that Lakoff's distinction has nothing to do with the solid distinction between the but's for contrast, rectification and exception.
10. Hebrew, unlike English and French, is very rich in connectives for indirect contrast: ax, ulam, aval, ela she, are only part of the many lexical entries and syntactic constructions for conveying indirect contrast in Hebrew.
11. For our purposes, a conjunction as in (i) can be interpreted as the sentential conjunction in (i'):
(i) Many teachers but few students came to the party.
(i') Many teachers came to the party but few students did (come to the party).
There is little work on the syntax of conjunctions as in (i). Barwise and Cooper(1981) consider (i) to be a case of NP-conjunction (without argumentation) and propose that the right-monotonicity features of the quantifiers denoted by the NP's are responsible for the contrast between (i) and (ii) and between (ii) and (iii):
(ii) ? Many teachers but many students came to the party.
(iii) Many teachers and many students came to the party.
B&C propose that and NP-conjunctions require the two quantifiers in the conjunction to be of the same (increasing/decreasing) right monotonicity, whereas but NP-conjunctions require mixed monotonicity. We are not sure that this is the case because other factors may improve significantly a but conjunction without mixed monotonicity. For example:
(iv) Many teachers but also many students came to the party.
In addition, unlike B&C's observation with respect to and conjunctions, but conjunctions do preserve their acceptability in sentential conjunctions that express the same proposition. Compare (i) with (i'), (ii) with (ii'), and (iv) with (iv'):
(ii') ? Many teachers came to the party but many students did.
(iv') Many teachers came to the party but also many students did.
This might suggest that but is always to be analyzed as a (possibly elliptic) sentential conjunction and contrasts as the ones between (ii) and (iii) are due to the infelicity of (ii'). We leave this question open for further research.
12. We refer of course only to the contrast presupposition and not to other possible presuppositions of the conjunction.
of a formula is defined relative to the structure as a whole, and not with respect to a specific world in the structure. Meyer & van der Hoek introduce a definition for but within a variant of S 5 modal logic. Both papers' point of departure is to define p but q in a two-valued logic as equivalent (roughly) to p^q^3(p ! :q) , which resembles our definition for nvs.
However, the discussion in the previous sections shows that there are at least three central problems for this attitude with respect to its linguistic adequacy:
(a) but is identified with nvs, so only direct contrast is analyzed.
(b) Implication is identified with material implication with no further account of the "paradoxes" of contrast.
(c) The definition for but is in truth-conditional terms,which is an over-simplification of the linguistic facts.
19. 
